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HOLDS A PLAINTIFF MAY UTILIZE THE
MIXED-MOTIVES METHOD OF ANALYSIS
IN AGE DISCRIMINATION CASES,
ABSENT ANY DIRECT EVIDENCE
OF DISCRIMINATION
RA CHID V. JACK IN THE Box, INC.
Lindsey Watkins*
N the recent case, Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals altered the analysis of age discrimination cases
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") so
that a plaintiff may prevail on a mixed-motives theory of discrimination
absent any direct evidence of age discrimination.1 The Supreme Court
has adopted two methods of analyzing discrimination cases over the last
thirty-one years: the traditional "pretext" method and the more modem
"mixed-motive" method. 2 In Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, the Supreme
Court addressed the level of proof necessary for a plaintiff to receive a
mixed-motives jury instruction in employment discrimination cases. 3
Based primarily upon amendments made to Title VII of the 1991 Civil
Rights Act, the Court in Costa decided that a mixed-motives instruction
could be given in Title VII cases absent direct evidence of discrimina-
tion.4 The circuit courts have not yet fully determined Costa's impact on
the traditional "pretext" method.5 Despite the undetermined impact of
* Candidate for J.D., Dedman School of Law at Southern Methodist University,
May 2006.
1. 376 F.3d 305, 316 (5th Cir. 2004).
2. Id. at 308.
3. 539 U.S. 90, 98 (2004).
4. See id. at 98-102.
5. See Christopher R. Hedican et al., McDonnell Douglas: Alive and Well, 52 DRAKE
L. REV. 383, 403-04 (2004) (analyzing the viability of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973)). The courts are split as to whether Costa completely overrules the
McDonnell Douglas approach or merely modifies the approach, giving two methods for
proof: pretext or mixed-motives. This issue is discussed to a limited extent in Rachid v.
Jack in the Box, Inc.; however, this note will not address it.
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this decision on Title VII cases, the Fifth Circuit recently applied the
Costa decision to an ADEA case. However, the Fifth Circuit was incor-
rect in its decision to apply the Costa mixed-motive analysis to an ADEA
case because of (1) the difference in statutory language between the
ADEA and Title VII; (2) the fact that the ADEA was not amended as
Title VII was; and (3) the fact that age may correlate with legitimate,
nondiscriminatory factors more often than other factors, such as race or
gender, will. Moreover, the Fifth Circuit is not the only circuit to have
discussed Costa's applicability on ADEA cases. Decisions from other cir-
cuits indicate that a circuit split is almost certain to arise.6
In October 1995, Jack in the Box, Inc. hired Ahmed Rachid as a man-
ager.7 Rachid served as a manager for two Jack in the Box restaurants
and Patrick Powers began supervising him in September 1999. Soon
thereafter, Powers began criticizing Rachid regularly, primarily making
disparaging comments regarding Rachid's age, which another Jack in the
Box manager corrobarated. 8 Rachid, who was fifty-two-years-old at the
time, reported the comments to Jack in the Box's human resources de-
partment and requested a transfer, fearing that Powers would fire him
because of his age. Despite these complaints, Rachid was never trans-
ferred and was eventually fired in February 2001. According to Jack in
the Box, Rachid was fired for violating company policy with regards to
recording his employees' time.9
Rachid brought forth evidence that created conflict on the issue of
whether he actually violated company policy. The policy in question was
sent in an e-mail written by Powers, but was not found in the employee
handbook. 10 The e-mail concerned the proper method of altering an em-
ployee's hours for break changes during the day.11 After the e-mail was
sent, a Jack in the Box human resources employee investigated several
time alterations at the restaurants that Rachid managed and informed
Powers that someone was altering employee times and that he must de-
termine who (Rachid or another manager) was making the improper
changes. While Rachid later admitted to making the changes, he con-
tended that Powers did not investigate who was responsible for the
changes, but rather immediately terminated Rachid upon learning the
information.12
Upon termination, Rachid filed an Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission charge complaining of age discrimination under the ADEA,
6. Mareish v. Walker, 359 F.3d 330, 340 (4th Cir. 2004) (noting in dictum that Con-
gress amended only Title VII and did not make any changes to the ADEA); Hill v. Lock-
heed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 285 n.2 (4th Cir. 2004) (same); Chambers
v. Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 351 F.3d 848, 855-56 (8th Cir. 2003) (applying Mc-
Donnell Douglas to an ADEA case without commenting on Costa).





12. Rachid, 376 F.3d at 308.
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and he received a Right to Sue letter.13 Rachid then filed an age discrimi-
nation claim under the ADEA, alleging that he was terminated from his
managerial position at Jack in the Box because of his age.' 4 Jack in the
Box filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court
granted. 15 The trial court found summary judgment appropriate because
Rachid had failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination and
had failed to rebut Jack in the Box's legitimate, non-discriminatory basis
for terminating Rachid. 16 As indicated by its language that "nothing in
the record suggests that Jack in the Box's basis for terminating Rachid
was a pretext," the district court clearly applied the traditional McDon-
nell Douglas "pretext" approach in analyzing Rachid's claim. 17
Rachid appealed, arguing that the case should have been analyzed
under the most recent mixed-motives method endorsed in Desert Palace,
Inc. v. Costa. Confirmation of the age-related comments made by Powers
to Rachid by another Jack in the Box manager was circumstantial evi-
dence most likely sufficient for Rachid to withstand Jack in the Box's
motion for summary judgment. Jack in the Box, however, maintained
that the mixed-motives analysis was applicable only in cases where there
was direct evidence of discrimination, which did not exist in this case, and
that the McDonnell Douglas analysis used by the district court was there-
fore appropriate.' 8
Over time, the Supreme Court has created two alternative methods for
proving discrimination in employment cases: the "pretext" method cre-
ated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (as the trial court used in
Rachid) and the "mixed-motives" method established in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins.19 Both of these analyses arose in the context of
Title VII employment-discrimination cases. 20 Under the McDonnell
Douglas approach, the initial burden of production rests with the plaintiff
to prove a prima facie case of discrimination. 2' Once the plaintiff meets
this burden, the defendant must prove a legitimate and non-discrimina-
tory reason for termination; however, even if the defendant meets this
burden, the plaintiff can still prevail if he or she can demonstrate that the
reason given for termination was a mere pretext.22 At all times during
the burden shifting, the ultimate burden of proving age discrimination
rests with the plaintiff.23
13. Id.
14. Id. at 307.
15. Id. at 308.
16. Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., No. CIV.A. 3:01-CV-0966-K, 2003 WL 21750817,
at *1 (N.D. Tex. 2003).
17. Rachid, 376 F.3d at 308 (quoting Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc. 2003 WL
21750817, at *1 (N.D. Tex. 2003) (internal quotations omitted)).
18. Id. at 310.
19. Id. at 309.
20. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 793-94 (1973); Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 232 (1989).
21. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
22. Id. at 802-05.
23. See Rachid, 376 F.3d at 309.
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In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court created an alterna-
tive method for proving Title VII discrimination. The Court in Price
Waterhouse focused on Congress' primary goal in creating Title VII, not-
ing Title VII's purpose is "'to promote hiring on the basis of job qualifica-
tions, rather than on the basis of race or color."24 To accomplish this
goal, Congress "eliminate[d] certain bases for distinguishing among em-
ployers while otherwise preserving employers' freedom of choice" in em-
ployment decisions.2 5 In order to give weight to Congress' intent to
balance the rights of the employers with those of the employees, the
Court in Price Waterhouse promulgated the mixed-motives method
stating,
[O]nce a plaintiff in a Title VII case shows that [a discriminatory fac-
tor] played a motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant
may avoid a finding of liability only by proving that it would have made
the same decision even if it had not allowed [the discriminatory factor] to
play such a role.26
Importantly, the Court noted that once the plaintiff made his or her
case, the defendant-employer will prevail only by persuading the
factfinder that it would have made the same decision regardless of the
discriminatory factor. 27 The Court divided, however, on the type of evi-
dence needed to shift the burden to the employer.28 The lower courts, in
trying to apply the mixed-motives analysis described in Price Waterhouse,
primarily chose to follow Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion that di-
rect evidence of discrimination is required for the burden to shift to the
employer.2 9
Due in large part to this confusion regarding the type of evidence
needed to obtain a mixed-motives analysis, Congress amended Title VII
in order to set the applicable evidence standards for "mixed-motives"
cases.30 The Supreme Court recently addressed these statutory changes
and their impact on employment discrimination cases in Desert Palace,
Inc. v. Costa.31 The Court held that when a plaintiff presents evidence
that allows a reasonable jury to conclude by a preponderance of that evi-
dence that a discriminatory factor was a motivating factor for the employ-
ment practice, then the plaintiff could obtain a mixed-motive jury
instruction.32 At the foundation of the Costa decision was Congress'
amendment of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, as evidenced by the Court's
focus on its newly amended sections, sections 2000e-2(m) and 2000e-
24. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244 (quoting 110 CONG. REc. 7213 (1964)).
25. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 239.
26. Id. at 244-45.
27. Id. at 246. The Court also noted that the defendant-employer's "burden" might
more appropriately be deemed an affirmative defense. Id.
28. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
29. Id. at 96.
30. Id. at 94.
31. Id. at 92.
32. Id. at 101.
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5(g)(2)(b). 33 Congress had amended the Act to include a specific
"mixed-motives" section, section 2000e-2(m), which states that a plaintiff
need only "demonstrate[ ]" that an illegal motive was a "motivating fac-
tor" in the employment decision.34 Congress defined "demonstrate[ ]" as
"mee[ting] the burdens of production and persuasion. '35 The Court rea-
soned that when a heightened requirement of direct evidence was re-
quired in other cases, Congress had specifically called for it within the
statute's language.36 Because no such requirement was specifically in-
cluded in the amended Title VII, only a preponderance of evidence was
required to obtain a mixed-motives jury instruction. 37 Thus, Congress's
amendments to Title VII were read as specifically delineating the exis-
tence of the mixed-motive analysis and the proof necessary to obtain such
an analysis.
The importance of the Supreme Court's decision in Costa cannot be
underestimated. Summary judgment will be eased, enabling plaintiffs to
survive because they will not have to present direct evidence of a discrim-
inatory factor being used in the employment action or have to prove un-
true the defendant's offered reason for the employment action.38 Under
Costa, the plaintiff's burden is much lower because he or she must show
only that the defendant's reason, even if true, is only one reason for its
conduct.39 Additionally, the mixed-motives method makes it more diffi-
cult for a defendant to win employment cases because the burden of
proof actually shifts to the defendant. However, despite these advantages
to plaintiffs, defendants also receive benefits from the Costa decision and
the Title VII amendments. In amending Title VII, Congress also added a
section that limits damages in cases where the defendant can prove the
same employment decision would have been made without the discrimi-
natory factor. 40 In those cases, the plaintiff cannot recover damages and
cannot be reinstated; rather, the plaintiff may only obtain attorney's fees
and declaratory or injunctive relief.41 Thus, a mixed-motive instruction
benefits both parties in an employment discrimination case because it al-
lows plaintiffs to more easily survive summary judgment, while at the
same time severely limiting the plaintiff's remedies. For these reasons, it
is entirely possible that while a plaintiff may begin by arguing under a
mixed-motives theory at summary judgment, he or she will attempt to
create a "pretext" case once surviving the summary judgment stage.
The ADEA is clearly an act that is separate and distinct from Title VII;
nonetheless, courts have consistently applied the pretext analysis, and to
33. Id. at 98-102.
34. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(m) (2003).
35. 41 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(m).
36. Costa, 539 U.S. at 99.
37. Id.
38. Mark Shwartz et al., What Now after Desert Palace v. Costa?, 22 No. 3 Ass'N CORP.
COUNS. DOCKET 46, 52-54 (2004).
39. See id. at 52.




some extent the mixed-motives analysis, to ADEA cases. 42 The Fifth Cir-
cuit took this one step further by applying the new mixed-motives analy-
sis developed in Costa to Rachid's ADEA case. 43 The court began by
analyzing and comparing the text of the two statutes, primarily focusing
on their "core" sections. The court emphasized that both the ADEA and
section 2000e-2(a) of Title VII contained the strikingly similar text
prohibiting discrimination "'because of' a protected characteristic. '44
While the court discussed the similarities in these "core" sections of the
two statutes, it based its decision upon the fact that neither Title VII nor
the ADEA has language of a heightened direct evidence standard.45 Al-
though some circuit courts have followed this reasoning, there has been
some indication that this was neither the proper analysis nor the proper
decision.46
Congress did not amend the ADEA to include statutory language simi-
lar to that found in Title VIi's mixed-motive section. Despite the Fifth
Circuit's reference to the similarity of the "core" language of Title VII
and the ADEA, the court was actually comparing the ADEA text with
the text of the original, unamended Title VII language (section 2000e-
2(a)), and not with the language of Title VII's amended "mixed-motives"
section (2000e-2(m)). Thus, contrary to the Fifth Circuit's holding, the
language of the pertinent Title VII section, section 2000e-2(m), is not
strikingly similar to that of the ADEA. The ADEA still does not differ-
entiate between "mixed-motive" cases and "pretext" cases with its "be-
cause of" language, whereas Title VII now has two separate sections for
these two types of cases. 47 As stated, Title VII's "mixed-motive" section
does not include "because of" language but rather says the discriminatory
factor was a "motivating factor."'48 This difference in language strongly
evidences that the Fifth Circuit should not have applied Costa to the
ADEA claims. Other courts have remarked on this distinction-the lack
of the "motivating factor" language in the ADEA-between the two
statutes.
4 9
Despite focusing on the statute's "core" language, the Fifth Circuit
claims its holding is based upon the lack of a heightened direct evidence
standard in the ADEA, as was similarly relied upon by the Court in Costa
with regards to Title VII; however, this argument is also weak. To main-
tain a higher evidentiary burden in ADEA cases, despite the statute's
42. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000) (acknowledg-
ing that the Court has never decided whether the McDonnell Douglas framework applies
to ADEA cases, but assuming that the McDonnell Douglas framework so applies).
43. Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 311 (5th Cir. 2004).
44. Id. at 310-11.
45. Id. at 312 n.8.
46. Compare Estades-Negroni v. Assoc. Corp. of N. Am., 345 F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir.
2003), and Strauch v. Am. College of Surgeons, 301 F. Supp. 2d 839, 844 (N.D. Ill. 2004),
with Mareish v. Walker, 359 F.3d 330, 340 (4th Cir. 2004).
47. Compare 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) (2003), and 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(m),
with 29 U.S.C.A. § 623 (1999).
48. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(m).
49. Zhuang v. Datacard Corp., 2004 WL 1887498, *9 (D. Minn. 2004).
[Vol. 58
language, is not questionable because age often correlates with clearly
legitimate, non-discriminatory employment decisions.50 The statute itself
acknowledges this point, creating a section that makes it legal for an em-
ployment decision to be based upon age if age was considered because it
was "a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of the particular business."51 Furthermore, when Con-
gress amended Title VII, it made a conscientious decision not to include a
heightened direct evidence standard. The ADEA has not been amended,
so it cannot be conclusively stated that Congress intends for the mixed-
motives analysis to apply to ADEA cases. Finally, Title VII's legislative
history states that Title VII was not to affect any other employment fac-
tors or qualifications, 52 bringing into question how much impact Title VII
cases should have even initially had upon ADEA cases. Thus, based
upon the difference in statutory language between Title VII and the
ADEA, the fact that the ADEA was not amended as Title VII was, and
the fact that age may tend to correlate with legitimate, nondiscriminatory
factors more often than other factors (for example, race or gender), a
strong argument can be made that the Fifth Circuit over-extended the
boundaries of the Supreme Court's holding in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa
by applying it to ADEA cases.
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., provides
plaintiffs the opportunity to forego the difficulty of proving that a defen-
dant's proffered legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for an employment
decision is untrue. Instead, the plaintiff must merely show that even if
the defendant's reason is true, another "motivating factor" was the plain-
tiff's age. Thus, this ruling could mean that more age discrimination cases
will survive a motion for summary judgment. In deciding to expand the
reach of Costa to ADEA cases, the Fifth Circuit is likely to clog the dock-
ets with potentially unsupported age discrimination cases, as well as cause
a split among the circuits. Despite the fact that the Supreme Court has
never ruled on the applicability of Title VII analyses options to ADEA
cases, if the circuits split, as seems inevitable, the Court will have to fi-
nally answer the questions of how ADEA cases should be analyzed and
whether direct evidence is necessary for a mixed-motives instruction in
such cases.
50. Mareish, 359 F.3d at 340.
51. 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(f)(1).
52. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244 (1989) (quoting 110 CONG. REc.
7213 (1964)).
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